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Summary findings
Competing conceptions of the large, unprotected,  This is particularly relevant in the debate about
"informal" workforce in developing countries differ  establishing common labor standards in regional trade
greatly in their implications for the labor reform  agreements.
considered to be essential complements to trade  Maloney reexamines the traditional view of the dual
liberalization and "fair" competition in international  labor market by studying the dynamics between the
trade.  formal and informal sectors across a business cycle and a
Traditionally, the informal sector is viewed as the  period of trade liberalization in Mexico (1987-93).
disadvantaged segment of a dual labor market segmented  He shows conventional comparisons of earnings, even
by legislated or union-induced rigidities and high labor  across time, to be unreliable tests for segmentation. As an
costs in the protected  (or "formal") sector. In this view,  alternative, he shows that transitions on informal
the size of the informal sector is a testament to the  employment, the size of the informal sector, and levels of
inefficiencies in labor allocation and the magnitude of  mobility to be procyclical, increasing with upturns, and
required reform. In cyclical downturns, the informal  decreasing with recessions. He tests for, and finds,
sector is thought to absorb displaced workers  from the  however, some evidence of queuing to enter formal
formal sector (with informal earnings falling relative to  employment.
those in the formal sector) and then to contract again  Overall, he contends, the informal sector behaves as an
during recovery as the queue for "good jobs" shortens  unregulated entrepreneurial sector rather  than the
again.  disadvantaged wing of a dual labor market. There is
A recent, related view postulates a long-term trend in  evidence of increased subcontracting over time, with
which large enterprises, confronted by heightened global  trade liberalization, but it is not clear that workers are
competition, increasingly subcontracts to unprotected  worse off as a result.
workers as a way to reduce costs and gain flexibility.
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The competing conceptions of the large, unprotected or "informal"  work force in developing
countries  differ greatly in their  implications for the labor market reforms deemed  essential to
complement other liberalization measures,' as well as issues of "fair" competition in international
trade.
The traditional view sees informality  as the disadvantaged  segment of a dualistic labor market
segmented by legislated or union-induced rigidities  and high labor costs in the protected or "formal"
sector.2 The large size of the sector thus testifies to the extent of inefficiencies  in labor allocation and
the magnitude of required reforms. Downward formal wage rigidity also implies strong predictions
about sectoral interactions across time.  In cyclical downturns, the informal sector is thought to
absorb displaced formal sector workers, informal earnings falling relative to  those in the formal
sector, and then contract during recoveries as lhe queue for good jobs shortens again. A recent and
related approach also postulates a long term trend where large enterprises, confronted by heightened
competition in global manufacturing, increasingly  sub-contract to unprotected workers as a means
of reducing costs and gaining flexibility. 3 The issue is thus particularly relevant to the debate over
establishing common labor standards in regional free trade agreements.
'See, for example,  World  Bank  (1995).
2 The  Harris-Todaro  (1970)  model  is perhaps  the  traditional  statement  of  this view. See  also Sabot  (1977),  and
Mazumdar  (1983).  An alternate  view  within  the  segmentation  literature  sees  dualism  as arising  endogenously  from
efficiency  wage  type  considerations  that  induce  larger  irmns  to pay  remuneration  above  market  clearing  (See
Stiglitz,  1974;  Esfahani  and Salehi-Isfahani,  1989).  See  Rosenzweig  (1988),  Fields  (1990),  Thomas  (1992),
Tokman  (1992),  Portes  and Schaufiler  (1993),  Portes  (1994)  for  overviews.
3 See  Piore  and  Sabel  (1984),  Beneria  (1989),  Port=s,  Castells  and  Benton  (1989),  Portes  and Schauffler
(1989),  Tokman  (1992)  and most  recently  articles  in Blank  and Freeman  (1994).  The  U.S. Department  of Labor
has  sponsored  two  studies  on the  informal  sector:  Worikers  Without  Protections:  Case  Studies  of the  Informal
Sector in Developing  Countries  (1993) and The  Infornal  Sector  in Mexico  (1992).However,  there is some  support  for an alternate  conception  that sees  the lack of protection
as one dimension  of an unregulated,  yet dynamic,  sector  of small  scale  entrepreneurs  many  of whom
enter the sector voluntarily  and who choose, and are able, to remain  largely outside the formal
regulatory  structures. 4 Labor markets may therefore  be broadly  integrated,  and the existence  of
unprotected  labor  is not in itself  evidence  of segmentation.  Arguably,  workers contemplating  self-
employment  would wait  for an auspicious  business  climate  before  leaving  a protected  job to launch
their enterprise  and would  be more likely  to fail during  a downturn,  inverting the counter-cyclical
patterns of entry and exit predicted  by the dualistic  view. As.  will be argued,  the benefits  of being
informal  may  extend  even  to subcontracting  relations  which  are generally  thought  to benefit  only  the
employer.
Research  on the informnal  sector has largely  relied  on case studies,  or static comparisons  of
earnings  differentials  which  tend to show  that formal  sector workers earn  more given their human
capital. But to date, the data  have  not existed  to study  sectoral  interactions  across  time. This paper
takes advantage  of an extraordinary  longitudinal  data set from Mexico  that permits  an examination
of the dynamics  among  the various subsectors  of the labor markets  from 1987-1993.  This period
encompasses  a complete  business cycle, a far reaching trade  reform, and pursuit of regional
integration  through  NAFTA.
The paper first argues that traditional  earnings  comparisons  are not reliable measures  of
segmentation,  even  when viewed across  time. It then  examines  movements  in relative  sector sizes,
the role of the various  sectors  in generating  and  absorbing  the unemployed,  and  the changing  patterns
4See, for  example  Hart  (1972),  de Soto (1989),  Tokman  (1992),  Fields  (1990),  Tunham and  Er&cal  (1990),
Portes  and  Shauffier  (1992).
2of mobility  among  sectors  across  the business  cycle.  It also explicitly  explicitly  tests for queuing  to
enter  formal  sector  employment.  Overall,  the  second  "entrepreneurial"  view  emerges  as the  better  first
approximation.  The last section  offers  preliminary  evidence  on the incidence  of subcontracting  and
its impact  on worker  welfare  by tracking  the composition  of the labor  force  after  trade  liberalization
in a more comprehensive  way than  has been possible  to date.
IL Data
The Mexican  case is well-suited  to the study of dualism,  informality,  and subcontracting.
First, roughly  40% of the  urban  labor  force  works  without  labor  protections.  Second,  an archaic  and
onerous system  of labor  regulation,  dating  back  over half  a century,  grants  little  flexibility  and drives
up labor  costs. The Constitution  conceives  of the employment  relationship  as a lifetime  contract  and
workers may  only be fired  under  extreme  circumstances  and at great cost. For their part, workers
lose generous  severance  pay and may  lose their  pensions  if they quit, and enjoy  no unemployment
insurance  should  they  be laid  off. Taken  at face  value,  the labor  code  thus discourages  the mobility
necessary  to ensure an efficient  allocation  of workers and jobs, and constrains  employers  in their
management  of personnel.  Legally  mandated  non-wage  compensation  drives  a wedge of 30-60%,
substantially  above  those for other OECD  countries. Third,  the radical  trade reforms  beginning  in
1986  and the subsequent  pursuit  of regional  inl:egration  through  NAFTA  converted  a relative  closed
economy  to one competing  aggressively  in  both import  and export  markets.  The  resulting  adjustment
of its labor market can offer some preliminary  observations  on the issue of globalization  and
subcontracting.
The National  Urban Employment  Survey  (NUES)  conducts  extensive  quarterly  household
3interviews  in the major metropolitan  areas and is available  from 1987  to 1993.  This permits  the
generation  of time series  of relative  earnings  for each sector  at quarterly  frequency. The NUES is
also structured so as to generate panels which allow tracking  a fifth of each sample  across five
quarters. Workers  are matched  by position  in an identified  household,  sex, level of education,  and
age to ensure against  generating  spurious transitions.  These panels permit sketching  patterns of
mobility  among  sectors  that can be tracked across  the seven  year  period.  The analysis  restricts  itself
to men  aged 16-65  with a high school  education  or less.
While  the term "informal"  suffers  from overly  broad and imprecise  usage, it refers here to
owners  and  workers  in firms  under 16 employees  who do not have  social  security  or medical  benefits
and are therefore  not protected.' Four sectors of paid  work are studied  that include  formal  salaried
employment  and three "informal"  sectors:  The self-employed  including  owners  of informal  firms;  the
informal  salaried,  those working  in informal  firms;  and contract  workers,  those who do not receive
a regular wage or salary, but who are paid as a percentage,  by piece, on commission,  or fixed
contract. They may be affiliated with a larger firm that  provides raw materials, but work
independently  and are those most likely  to be involved  in subcontracting  relations. There is also a
residual  "other" category  (not shown)  that includes  firm  owners  who are protected,  and owners  and
unprotected  workers in firms  of over 16 people. The remainder  of the interviewed  population  (to
total 100%)  is divided  into three classes  of individuals  who are not working:  those out of the labor
5 There  appear  to  be workers  at  larger  firms  who  do  not  report  having  benefits,  however  this  is stretching  our
idea  of  informality  beyond  the  smaller  scale  industries  usually  contemplated  and  may,  in addition,  be due  to
measurement  error.  Since  it is  often  the  wife  of  the  worker  who  is at  home  at  the  time  of  the  survey,  it is  entirely
possible  that  they  are not informed  about  their  husbands  true  employment  conditions.  STPS  also  argued  that there
may  be some  very  transitory  workers  for large  firms  not covered  in violation  of  the  law.
4force, not currently working and not searching; those studying;  and the unemployed. 6
Movements among sectors are best captured in transition matrices  that present the conditional
probability of finding a worker in sector j at the end of the period given that the worker began in
sector i, Pij, as well as initial and terminal sector sizes, PL  and PJ.  As this would require 24 large
matrices to cover the sample period, figures land 2 instead graphically present elements of these
matrices  serially.  Figure 1 shows the evolution of the sectoral composition of the interviewed
population PL  using the entire sample. Figure 2 plots the probability  of transition into and out of the
formal sector standardized by the probability that in a random reshuffling a worker would finish in
the terminal sector (relative sector size) P?j.  Figure 3 presents median hourly real earnings,
adjusted for human capital. 7
m.  Overview of the Period.
Using the median hourly real earnings in each sector in figure 3, and the macro-aggregates
in tables 1-3, we can divide  the period 1987-1993  broadly  into three phases, recession, recovery, and
slowdown.
Phase I: As Lustig (1992) details, 1986 and 1987 were years of deep recession surrounded
by the uncertainty of the success of the stabilization  and reform programs. The balance of payments
The definition  of unemployment  differs  slightly  from  the  official  which  includes  those  searching  for  work.  It
includes  this group,  plus  those  who  are  waiting  for  the response  to an application,  a call  from  an employer  that is
expected  in 3 months  or less,  the next  cycle  of  work,  and  those  who  consider  that  there  is currently  no work  or  that
they  would  not be given  work  if they  applied.  It then  subtracts  those  in school  who  are  looking  for  work  because
they  already  occupy  the  category  of "Studying."  This generates  a statistic  that  broadly  tracks,  although  is above  the
official  rate  tabulated  in table  1.
7The  medians  were  calculated  conditional  on experience,  experience  squared,  education  and education
squared.
5crisis in mid-1985 led to extreme contractionary measures which were undermined by the 50% fall
in oil prices in 1986. GDP fell by 3.8% and manufacturing  wages fell another 5.90/o.  Before turning
up again, real wages  had fallen a cumulative 39% since the beginning of the crisis.  As figure 3
suggests, the recession had a depressive effect on earnings through 1987, which, in all sectors, show
great downward flexibility. During this period, Mexico embarked upon the first wave of dramatic
trade liberalization: From 1985 to 1990, maximum  import tariffs fell by 50% while import licensing
fell to a quarter of previous levels. 8 The depreciated peso and depressed wages, however, initially
provided some cushion of competitiveness.
Phase II.  As table 2 shows, economic growth began a moderate recovery in 1987, 1.86%,
that would peak at 4.46% in 1990. In December, the Economic Solidarity Pact, a joint agreement
of government and formal representative of labor, and the business sectors was implemented that
featured a comprehensive  incomes policy  supported by reduction ofthe fiscal deficit, tighter monetary
policy, and trade liberalization.  12 The Pact successfully  reduced inflation to 1.2% per month in the
second half of 1988.  Although employment  growth was moderate and concentrated heavily in the
construction sector, in 1990 open unemployment  fell to 2.6%, its lowest level since 1976 (see tables
1 & 3).  As figure 3 shows, from 1988:1 to roughly 1990:3, earnings in all sectors grew concomitant
with the tightening labor market, especially  in the self-employed  and contract sectors where they rose
over 30%.  In 1990, the government initiated discussions  of a free trade agreement with the United
States.
s See  Lustig  (1992)  and  Maloney  and  Azevedo  (1996)
2In February  1988,  the  governuent  effectively  froze  public  prices  and  the  exchange  rate,  and minimum  wages
were  raised  3%  then  fixed.  For  its part,  the  private  sector  committed  to not raising  prices.
6Phase m:  The economy began to  soften from  1992-1993 with growth  rates slowing
dramatically  to .45% in 1993, sustained only by continued growth in the non-manufacturing  sectors.
The official measure of unemployment again rose to 3.4% as manufacturing shed workers and job
creation in the construction and commerce sectors slowed. Earnings in all informal sectors declined
in absolute terms and relative to formal sector wages which stagnated.
The next two sections test the competing hypotheses outlined previously by examining  first,
the behavior of earnings differentials  and second, patterns of mobility across the period.
IV. Relative Earnings Movements and Segimentation.
Figure  3 reveals clear patterns  in relative earnings.  First,  seemingly contradicting the
segmentation arguments, self-employment pays generally  better than formal sector employment.
Second, the similarity  of the behavior of contract worker earnings  suggests that these two sectors are
closely related.  Third, informal salaried workers appear to receive consistently less than the formal
sector wage.
The literature  on  dualism has relied almost exclusively on these kinds of cross-sectoral
earnings  comparisons, finding higher formal sector earnings to be  evidence of segmentation." 3
However, the interpretation of earnings differentials  cannot be this straightforward since the specific
characteristics  of work that pertain to or even clefine  the formal and informal sectors affect earnings
in each sector and make it unclear what the magnitude or sign of the differential should be even in an
unsegmented market.  In a market with no distortions, earnings in the informal sector should rise
13 See  Rosenzweig  (1988).  Somewhat  unusually,  Marcouiller,  Ruiz,  and Woodruff  (1994)  find higher  mean
earnings  in the Mexican  informal  sector  than  the  formal.
7above that in the formal sector to compensate for the expected value of benefits received by formal
sector workers.  Similarly,  formal sector workers would require compensation for taxation which
informal sector workers may often avoid. Formal salaried work and informal self-employment may
also differ in hours worked, degree of risk taken, degree  of independence, and costs of capital
invested that may further drive a wedge between reported earnings. Informal salaried workers are
frequently young and related to informal  entrepreneurs and thus their earnings may be net of training
costs or unobserved payments in kind. In the absence of information on these factors, the magnitude
of the distortion-free differential  cannot be known a priori and the interpretation of the raw earnings
differentials reported in previous studies as evidence of segmentation becomes less clear.
In fact, it is arguable that the customary strategy of establishing segmentation by observing
earnings differentials should be inverted.  There is some reason to believe that Phase II represents a
period absent of segmentation: As Bell (1994) and Davila (1996) have argued, the minimum wage
was not binding and the historically low unemployment rates were held by Lustig to be the result of
extraordinary downward flexibility in (formal sector) wages. It  may therefore  be reasonable to
consider the observed differentials in figure 3 as reference values for unsegmented markets that
account for all the effects detailed above. If this is the case, the assumption that a differential of zero
represents an unsegmented market underlying many previous studies is probably unjustified.
There is, however, substantial variance in differentials across the period.  Earnings  in the
closest substitute to formal salaried work, informal salaried work, rise from being  a minimum of 69%
of formal salaried wages in 1988:1 to a maximum  of 83% in 1990:3 before falling to 77% in 1993:4.
It might be argued that if the value of the unobserved arguments remains constant over time that the
initial narrowing of  14% represents evidence in support  of the dualistic view: In a  downturn,
8displaced  formal  sector  workers compete  in the informal  sector thereby expanding  the differential
between rigid formal  sector and market clearing  infornal sector earnings. But, it could also be
argued  that since  the Pact was intended  as a means of moderating  salary  increases,  it capped  them
below market clearing  during  phase  IS  yielding  a premium  to working in the unregulated  sectors
whose earnings  would  not have  been affected,
The relative  movements  may also reflect the existence  of skills  or capital that are sector
specific  over the short run, without  necessarily  implying  inferiority  of a particular  sector. Earnings
of an informal  skilled  carpenter  working on his own would rise dramatically  in phase II with the
increase  in construction  activity.  Installed  capital  in a workshop  or small  store  may  also lead  to self-
employed  workers  preferring  to earn subnormal  profits  in a recession  if there is an expectation  that
in an upturn there will be supernormal  profits. The reverse may also be true.  A worker with
substantial  firm  specific  capital,  or as  Lucas  (1978)  postulated,  little  entrepreneurial  ability,  may  ride
out a wage stagnation  in the formal  sector should he doubt that he would earn more as a small
businessman  over the long run.
In sum, neither the absolute  levels  of differentials,  nor their movement  across time yield
conclusive  evidence  in favor  of either  the dualistic  or integrative  hypotheses.
V. Sectoral  Behavior  and Patterns  of Transition.
However,  the evolution  of sector  sizes  and  the patterns  of worker  mobility  offers  can. While
offering  some  support  to the standard  dualistic  view,  the evidence  strongly  suggests  that the informal
sector may  be a desirable  destination  for many  workers. To begin,  figure  1 shows  that informal  self-
employment  attains its maximum  share  of the work force at the peak of the recovery in 1990.
9Informal  salaried  employment,  while less dramatic,  also locally  peaks in 1990. The lag behind  self-
employment  may  be due  to small  firms  hiring  only  after  being  established  for a period. Contrary  to
the bulk of the literature  on informality,  it is the informal  sector  that is expanding  as unemployment
falls  and  growth picks  up, while  formal  sector employment  falls.  Contract  work shows an initial  rise
after moving  out the recession,  but overall behaves  counter-cyclically  as the dualistic  view would
suggest.  However,  until  1991,  it also  broadly  tracks  movements  in  formal  sector employment,  whose
employment  share also behaves counter-cyclically  until 1991. The similarity  of the behavior  of
contract  and self-employed  earnings  suggests that both may  represent  equally  successful  types of
entrepreneurship,  but serve  different  clientele:  contract  workers  with larger  formal  sector firms,  the
self-employed  with a distinct market, perhaps  more  oriented  toward services  or smaller  customers.
The non-work sectors also show strong cyclical  behavior.  Unemployment  reaches its
minimum  at the height  of the expansion  in 1990. Being  out of the labor  force  appears  to be a luxury,
rather  than  the repository  of  discouraged  workers,  increasing  as  unemployment  falls,  and  falling  again
as the economy  worsens. The share of the labor force working  as unpaid workers also behaves
counter-cyclically  suggesting  that this subsector,  roughly  2% of the workforce, may  function as a
safety  net:  when  the economy  worsens,  perhaps  paid  family  members,  or those  out of the labor  force,
work for free. There is no obvious  explanation  for the secular  decline  in the share  of those in school.
Second,  the transition  probabilities  standardized  by terminal  sector  size (P,/P)  suggest  that
the increase  in activity  leads  to greater, and relatively  symmetrical,  mobility  between  the formal  and
informal  sectors. Mobility  between  formal  salaried  workers  and the self-employed  both rise as the
economy  strengthens  going  into 1990,  but  transitions  into self-employment  overall  seem  to rise  more
than  the reverse  (figure  2). The patterns of mobility  are somewhat  more  obscure  between  the formal
10salaried sector and the informal  salaried and contract sectors. In the latter, there are broadly
symmetrical  rises in movements  between secitors  going  into the upturn although  movements  into
contract  work become  relatively  more "fluid"  after 1990  than  the reverse  transitions  that dominated
earlier. Movements  between  formal  and informal  salaried  work, again,  heighten  in both directions
in 1990  although  any  symmetries  are less easy to detect. Overall,  rather than a unidirectional  flow
back into fornal sector employment  with economic  recovery,  there appears  to be accelerated  re-
matching  across all sectors, although, again,  most clearly  between  the self-employed  and formal
sectors.
Finally,  statistical  correlations  ofintersectoral  mobility  and  unemployment  do not suggest  that
the primary  function  of the informal  sector is to absorb  displaced  labor  during  downturns,  although
they do provide  some  evidence  of rationing. T'he  coefficients  in table  4 are those from the standard
exponential  form of a multinomial  logit.
__  =-p'  (1)
'  i,
where the vector ,Bj  measures  the degree  to which  an increase  in open  unemployment  (ji) increases
the probability  of a worker going to sector  j relative  to the probability  of staying  in sector i for all
sectors.
Several  findings  at odds with the traditional  dualistic  view emerge  from the table. First,
movement  into  unemployment  rises  in downturns  from  all  sectors,  both  formal  and  informal,  and,  with
the exception  of infornal salaried  work, significantly.  Movements  out of unemployment  decrease  in
downturns  into all  sectors  of  paid  work, although  significantly  only  for  the formal  salaried,  and  almost
at the 10% level for the informal  salaried. Both findings  suggest  that, contrary to the dualistic
11hypothesis, you can "lose" ajob in the informal sector and it is not obviously easier to find informal
work in a downturn. The one anomaly is informal salaried  work where from OLF, school, and unpaid
work, there is evidence of counter-cyclical entry, although only significantly  from OLF.
Looking at transitions within paid work, several relations are also striking. First, while it is
true that movements into formal salaried work fall as unemployment rises from every sector, this is
also true for self-employment,  confirming  the procyclical  behavior of sector size found earlier. Only
for the transition from formal salaried to contract work is there a significant positive coefficient.
Even informal salaried work shows a lower probability  of entering from self-employment, and only
a very insignificant positive relationship from formal salaried employment. Combined with the
previous finding that all sectors contribute to unemployment,  it is difficult to  sustain the view that
overall, the informal sectors are the safety net absorbing dismissed formal sector labor.
The increased relative movement  from both school and OLF into unemployment suggests  that,
as much as workers losing positions, unemployment is comprised of those in school and OLF who
begin to search for employment  to augment their family  incomes. This motivation would also explain
why, from every sector, except OLF, workers are less likely to return to school, significantly  so for
the unemployed, unpaid,  self-employed and informal salaried. The results are consistent with the
findings of Revenga and Riboud (1993) who argue that most labor market adjustments in Mexico
occur through dramatic falls in earnings in all sectors and thus relatively little labor is actually shed.
However, the fall in real incomes does drive those out of the labor force to  actively seek other
sources of income, thereby driving up unemployment.
12Is there evidence of queuing?
Although  the logit specification  captures  gross tendencies  during cyclical  downturns  for
movements  among  the four  modes  of work, we can  test explicitly  for rationing  by recasting  Abowd
and Farber's (1982) test for union-induced  segmentation  in a time series context." 4 At a given
moment  in time, a worker in current sector "c"  will  desire  to switch  to an alternate  sector "a"  if he
expects  a gain  in utility  which  is a function  both of earnings  and of non-wage  benefits  of working  in
the sector such  as those discussed  in section  IV. Since  many  ofthese factors--  independence,  medical
insurance,  or other labor  protections--  are not pegged  to the  wages,  these effects  are assumed  to be
constant  across  time leaving  the differential  rates of growth  of sectoral  earnings  as determining  the
relative  desirability  of each sector. Together,  the desire  to enter the alternate  sector is
Irt =  aaWat  acWc  - YFac  +  2
,:t  @a~c)(2)
F-lt  =(Eat  - ect)()
Where  yF. is  the unchanging  utility  arising  from  differing  non-wage  benefits  between  sectors  and  W,,
W, hat are the forecasted  values  from the standard  Mincerian  earning  equation
Wp=t  =PCt  + ect  (3)
Wat  =  4Jat  +  Eat
where  X is a vector of worker characteristics.  This  permits  proxying  for unobserved  earnings  in the
alternate  sector and avoiding-bias  in the estimates  of aC.`  The time subscript  on 3  reflects  the fact
that across  time similar  worker characteristics  may  lead  to different  earnings  in each sector.  This  may
14  See  Dickens  and Lang  (1985)  for  an alternate  test  of  queuing  using  endogenous  switching  models.
15  Replacing  only  the  unobserved  alternate  wage  with  the  forecasted  variable,  but using  the  realized  current
wage  has  the  potential  to bias  alpha  since  e, is likely  t. be correlated  with  W,. For  this reason,  both  wages  are
replaced  with  the  forecasted  values.
13result from any number of other structural or temporal factors including the level of  economic
activity.
This equation, however, yields only the unobserved desire to move, which may be thwarted
by any factor causing queuing or that affects the probability of being offered ajob in the new sector
once it is desired to seek it.  Since the unemployed are by definition, those looking or unable to find
jobs, this probability of being offered a job is a function of the state of  the labor market, ,u.
y2,  =  X ,+  R  2t  (4)
Particularly during cyclical  downturns, the informal  sector is generally posited to serve as the reserve
army of those unable, although willing, to take a job in the formnal  sector.  The unobserved latent
variable, Y2 determines whether or not a worker is selected from the queue, a queue which may be
of zero length in a period of high economic activity. The probability that an individual will be
observed in, for example, the alternate sector is the probability  that the worker desires  to work in that
sector (is in the queue) and is selected:
Pae  =  P[£1  >  aa F  - a,W:  - yFac] P[ 2 (5)
which constitutes a partially observable bivariate probit model.'6
'6In estimating  the  probit  specifications,  the  forecasted  wages  are generated  by regressing,  sector  by sector,  the
earnings  observed  on education,  experience,  education  squared,  and  experience  squared  for each  trimester,  and
then  generating  predicted  values  for  workers  in all other  sectors.  Each  worker  therefore  has  predicted  earnings  in
all four  sectors.  Since  the  constant  term  and coefficient  values  are  permitted  to vary  in each  time  period,  they
capture  any  temporally  varying  factors  including  cyclical  movements.  Were  unemployment  the  only  temporally
variant  element,  it would  not  be possible  to identify  eq's  (2)  and  (4),  but in practice,  the  individual  earnings  and
earnings  differentials  and unemployment  are  only  loosely  correlated  (p=. 25).
14Since there is evidence of barriers to entry to some informal sectors, the model is estimated
for all possible transitions." 7 The first columns of table 5 presents the estimates of equation 5.  In
several cases, the coefficients on the initial and alternate earnings are very asymmetrical and there
appears to  be covariance between one of the earnings variables and the  cyclical variable.  The
regressions in the following column constrain c,= -v.: a one percent rise in alternate sector earnings
is assumed to have the same effect as a one percent decline  in initial earnings. In no case, however,
does the  likelihood suggest that  the  constrained  regression  is a  better  specification than the
unconstrained.
As expected, from every sector, the probability  of entering the formal sector rises with the
formal sector wage and significantly  so (with the exception  of contract work), and falls  with the rise
in initial sector earnings, although never significantly.  From all other sectors, the cyclical variable
enters significantly and negatively in at least one of the two specifications. This suggests that there
is queuing to enter the formal sector that is exacerbated in cyclical downturns.
However, the previous findings of pro-cyclical movements into self-employment are also
preserved although their decreased significance  suggests  that much of the negative correlation with
unemployment was due to the large accompanying  relative earnings movements shown in figure 3:
in a downturn,  the returns to  self-employment falls and fewer workers want to move.  The still
significant coefficient from salaried  informal employment  does offer evidence of barriers to entering
self-employment.
17 See,  for example,  Assaad  (19950.  Tumham  and Er6cal  (1990)  argue  "... Perhaps  it may  not  be too  far-
fetched  in most  cases  to suppose  that  the condition  of  being  unemployed  actually  signifies  an inability  to operate  as
an entrepreneur  or to gain  access  via  a family  connection  [to  self-employment.  To the  extent  that  this is true,  the
unemployed  are,  in effect,  only  competing  for  work  in the  wage  labor  market"  (p. 32).
15The informal salaried sector appears to be the one sector where a strong case can be made
for the traditional view of the role of the informality. Rationing appears entering both the self-
emplo  yed and the salaried formal sector, and it is the only sector for which a significant  positive sign
appears  on  the  cyclical variable  when  entering from  formal salaried  employment. While the
interpretation in a queuing context is not obvious, the results do suggest that the sector may absorb
labor shed from formal employment.
V. Why Might Workers Prefer Informality?
Taken together,  the data is suggestive of a heterogeneous informal sector.  That there is
evidence of queuing to enter the formal sector suggests that some fraction of the sector serves as a
reserve sector as traditionally conceived. But the fact that self-employment  overall is procyclical in
size, and in probability of entering from all other sectors, suggests that this, the largest segment of
informality  constituting 25% of paid work, is best thought of as a desirable destination sector in itself.
This conclusion is consonant with Gregory's finding, analyzing  less comprehensive data from 1940-
1980, that the Mexican labor market is reasonably well integrated.
There may be two overarching reasons that workers may prefer informal  jobs, particularly
self-employment despite the ostensibly large benefits of being formally employed.
First, the inefficiencies  and rigidities  in formal sector regulations affect workers' demand for
formal employment as well as formal firms' demand for labor.  This is particularly the case in the
absence of a binding  minimum  wage where, as discussed before, overall remuneration must be equal
across sectors, but the costs of non-wage benefits is implicitly  paid by workers through lower wage
remuneration.  Should the value of benefits to the worker fall below the implicit tax, it would be
16preferable to move into an informal  sectorwhere payment is entirely  monetary. And, a key difference
between LDCs and industrialized  countries is that incomplete regulation ofthe labor mark-et  and small
finm  sector gives some entrepreneurs and employees exactly this choice of how to receive payment.
Several possible sources of such a wedge appear both in the nature of the labor protections
system and in interviews with workers. First, since an entire family is covered by medical benefits,
when any one member is formally employed, the marginal value of benefits to the second formal
sector worker is zero. Second, the quality of many services is often poor and administrative  overhead
costs are very high causing some workers to see mandatory contributions to benefits programs as a
disadvantage of formal salaried  work. " Third, leaving formal sector employment  voluntarily  may not
necessarily imply the loss of large separation benefits since, as Balan et al (1973)  argue, many
workers are not in a particular job long enough to accumulate much seniority.
This view is plausibly  consistent with the differentials  observed in figure 3. The roughly 30%
premium of self-employment and contract earnings over  formal salaried  wages, although  still
including the value of lifestyle  and risk premia, and taxes, is at the low end of the estimated 30-60%
in non- wage costs to firms. The persistent discount experienced  by the informal salaried relative to
the formal could be explained  if the value of benefits and the risk of working  for family  members were
perceived as low, and the value of avoided taxes, in kind payments, and training is high.
This logic applies to all three sectors although it is compelling only where small scale firms
can offer remuneration comparable to that earned in the formal sector--among low productivity
workers unlikely to generate much firm specific human capital. This gives rise to a second reason
18  In his interviews  with  Guadalajaran  workers,  RDberts  (1989,  p. 50)  found  that "many  informants  cited the
deductions  made  for welfare  as a disadvantage  of formal  employment,  particularly  since  the services  they  received
were  poor."
17that,  particularly self-employment, may be  desirable.  Being one's  own boss  is valued  in the
industrialized world, and there is no reason to think that developing country workers value their
independence  less. There is support in the extensive interviews ofMonterrey workers undertaken by
Balan, et al. (1973), and increasingly elsewhere, for a "life  cycle" pattern where workers enter into
salaried work, accumulate  knowledge, capital, and contacts, and then quit to open their own informal
businesses. The low formal sector productivity  and firm specific capital reduce the opportunity cost
of such moves and should lead to an increased share of self-employment  in total work.
VL Trade Reform and Sub-Contracting:
In phase II, contract work is not obviously a disadvantaged sector.  Figure 3 suggests that
contract earnings follow the  same increase relative to formal salaried wages  shown by the self-
employed.  Mobility between the formal and contract sectors is heightened during the upturn of
phase II.  It  is possible that  contracting exists partially as a Pareto improving way to  avoid the
inefficiencies  in the labor legislation (or duplication ofbenefits coverage) discussed above, rather than
to avoid the legislation per se, and that efficient  workers may do better on a piece rate basis in good
times than working in a factory."9
However,  the data  after  1991 may suggest a less sanguine interpretation  of increased
outsourcing to reduce labor costs in the face of increased global competition. Figure  1 reveals a
secular decline  in the contribution offormal salaried work, from over 38% to 35% of the interviewed
19Roberts'(1989)  Guadalajara  interviews  suggest  that given  the  very  weak  unions  and low  wages,
informalization  is not  primarily  a strategy  for reducing  remuneration  and  worker  control  over  production:  'Market
uncertainty  and  the large  number  of income  opportunities  in the  city  mean  that  it is usefiu  for both employees  and
employers  to have  flexibility  in allocating  labor."(italics  added,  p. 48).
18sample.  This  decline  is  offset  by a rise  in the share  of contract  workers  and  the informal  salaried  while
the rate of transition  into contract work from  formal  sector work now exceeds  the rate of reverse
transition. It  is clear from figure  3 that contract  earnings  are falling  at a more rapid rate than any
other sector, suggesting  that workers  are not better off as a result  of this trend. On the other hand,
contract earnings  are always the most volatile  of the four series  so it is not obvious that they are
losing  relatively  more than  would  be the case  in any  previous  downturn.
This  evolution  appears  correlated  with  a restructuring  ofthe manufacturing  sector  that is very
likely  related  to increased  external  competition.  Tables  2 & 3 show  that while  from 1990 to 1994
manufacturing  grew 7.8%, employment  in the sector actuallyfell  8.5%. The competitive  cushion
offered  by the high  real exchange  rate and soft  labor market  in the early  part of the period may  have
delayed  the bite  of reduced  protection  until 1990  and several  manufacturing  sectors sharply  reversed
their expansions  of the late 1980's  during  this period. 20 It is in 1990  that the trade balance  becomes
negative  for the first time  since 1982  due both to a rise in imports  as a share  of GDP from 13.3%  in
1987  to 18.9%  in 1993  and a fall in exports  from 17%  in 1990  to 14%  in 1993. Thus, the pressure
to cut costs and restructure  arguably  appeared  only  at the end of phase  II, the period when contract
work begins its secular expansion. Though only micro-analysis  of individual  firm behavior  can
confirm  whether  the sub-contracting  is in fact related  to global  competitive  pressures,  the evidence
here suggests  that this is the case.
20 Textiles  fell 15.7%  from 1990-1994,  wood  products  fell 18%  from 1991-94,  paper products  fell 7.9% from
1990  to 1994.  Sexto  Informe de Gobiemo,  1994.
19VIIL  Conclusions
The results  suggest  that a fraction  of the informal  sector conforms  to the traditional  dualistic
conception  of the unprotected  worker.  The narrowing  of earnings  differentials  during economic
recovery  and the evidence  of queuing for entry  into formal  salaried  are consistent  with a reserve
sector role during downturns. Further,  the behavior  of the contract sector  after 1990  does suggest
that workers are being shifted  from the protected  to informal  sector as a way of reducing costs,
possibly  with a reduction  in their welfare.
However,  for the bulk of the sector, informality  does not imply  inferior  work. The largest
component  ofthe informal  sector,  self-employment,  behaves  pro-cyclically,  expanding  during  upturns,
and also shows evidence of queuing  for entry.  A more apt conception  is that of a small scale,
entrepreneurial  sector, akin to those found in industrialized  countries, but unregulated.  This
interpretation  does  not rule out the dualistic  view dominating  when minimum  wages are binding  far
above market clearing. But where they are not, the taxes on formal  workers implicit  in the labor
legislation,  and the generally  low levels  of formal  sector  productivity,  make  working  in an informal
business  a desirable  alternative. Much of the informal  sector may  therefore represent  an efficient
allocation  of labor  that would  persist  even  in the absence  of labor market distortions.
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u  u  u  u
1976  6.8  1981  4.2  1986  4.3  1991  2.6
1977  8.1  1982  4.2  1987  3.9  1992  2.8
1978  6.8  1983  6.3  1988  3.6  1993  3.4
1979  5.7  1984  5.7  1989  3  1994  3.6
1980  4.6  1985  4.3  1990  2.8  1995  6.4*
Source: Lustig (1992) pp 22, 70;  Sexto Informe de C;obierno,  1994
*Provisional, Indicadores Economicos, Banco de Mexico.
Table 2:  GDP  and  Growth  by Sector (Millions of 1980 Pesos and  %)
GDP  %  Manu  %  Const
1986  4736  -3.74  995.8  -5.26  239.5  -10.33
1987  4824  1.86  1026.1  3.04  246.2  - 2.80
1988  4884  1.24  1059  3.21  245.2  -0.41
1989  5047  3.34  1135.1  7.19  250.4  2.12
1990  5272  4.46  1203.9  6.06  267.8  6.95
1991  5463  3.62  1252.2  4.01  274.3  2.43
1992  5616  2.80  1280.7  2.28  295.7  7.80
1993  5641  0.45  1261.7  -1.48  304.7  3.04
1994*  5836  -3:46  1297.3  2.82  334.2  9.68
Source: Sexto Informe  de Gobierno 1994.
*Imputed  from Indicadres  Economicos, Banco de M[exico
Table 3:  Employment  and  Growth  by Sector  (Tliousands and %)
Total  %  Manuf  %  Const  %
1986  21640.1  -1.44  2404.1  -1.88  1891.4  -3.28
1987  21863.5  1.03  2429.8  1.07  1897.8  0.34
1988  22051.2  0.86  2431.9  0.09  1903.9  0.32
1989  22330.9  1.27  2492.7  2.50  2129.1  11.83
1990  22536.4  0.92  2510.3  0.71  2411.1  13.25
1991  23121.5  2.60  2498.8  -0.46  2489.1  3.24
1992  23216.3  0.41  2447.2  -2.06  2629.9  5.66
1993*  NA  NA  2343.9  -4.22  NA  NA
1994*  NA  NA  2298.1  -1.95  NA  NA
Source: Sexto Informe  de Gobiemo  1994.
*  Imputed from Indicadores Economicos, Banco de Mexico, NA=Not Availablea  E  r 
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Partially Observed Bi-Variate Probit
Initial  Self-Employed  Informal  Salaried
Final  Inforrmal  Salaried  Formal Salaried  Contract  Self-Employed  Formal Salaried  Contract
Constl  -.36.39**  0.09  45.15*  5.21**  -1.43  -0.08  13.90**  0.11  4.81**  0.12  3.57  0.25
(5.28)  (12.72)  (12.42)  (I.80)  (55.32)  (112.6)  (1.86)  (0.48)  (0.95)  (0.30)  (14.82)  (67.95)
Wi  -0.43  -3.85  -0.1  1.04**  -0.29  0.58
(0.50)  (2.53)  (3.73)  (0.24)  (0.21)  (1.45)
Wa  -4.39**  9.38*  0.05  0.81**  0.96*"  -0.03
(0.80)  (2.66)  (1.8)  (0.18)  (0.17)  (0.19)
Wa-Wi  0.51  12.7**  0.14  3.41  2.26  -0.19
(4.17)  (5.00)  (12.11)  (2.37)  (1.47)  (10.89)
Const2  -1.14**  -0.45  -0.63*  -0.61"*  -0.22  -1.12  3.52  -0.09  6.88**  0.6  0.78  -0.56
(0.10)  (8.42)  (0.09)  (0.10)  (112.5)  (58.80)  (3.14)  (0.14)  (3.00)  (0.52)  (10.31)  (36.47)
Unem  0.003  -0.12  -0.21*  -0.22**  0.06  0.03  -0.81  -0.09'*  -1.76  -0.17**  0.15  0.06
(0.03)  (0.50)  (0.03)  (0.03)  (6.13)  (1.17)  (0.84)  (0.04)  (0.88)  (0.07)  (5.83)  (1.76)
Nobs  21492  21492  21831  21831  20873  20873  6659  6659  7453  7453  5529  5529
Likelihood  -6803  -6873  -7610  -7617  -5344  -5345  -4129  -4227  -4985  -5003  -2732  -2738
chi squared  148.28**  9.19**  64.18*  50.38**  1.13  0.86  212.37**  17.47**  83.03**  48.32**  13.77**  1.69
Initial  Formal Salaried  Contract
Final  Self-Employed  Informal Salaried  Contract  Self-Employed  Formal Salaried  Informal Salaried
Const I  -1.23  -0.15  -13.01*  0.18  -3.71*"  1.49**  3.63  0.18  -2.91  1.72  -22.27**  0.50
(1.17)  (26.30)  (1.58)  (0.45)  (0.53)  (0.19)  (25.83)  (68.88)  (6.71)  (1.37)  (5.24)  (29.10)
Wi  -0.29  -2.14**  -0.85*"  0.02  -0.99  -0.87**
(4.24)  (0.33)  (0.12)  (2.59)  (2.22)  (0.38)
Wa  0.13  0.56**  0.55"*  0.44  0.48  -2.01**
(1.91)  (0.17)  (0.12)  (2.59)  (1.11)  (0.52)
Wa-Wi  0.28  3.51**  0.78**  0.15  1.71  0.29
(5.90)  (0.61)  (0.12)  (9.42)  (2.23)  (7.13)
Const2  -0.64  -0.60  -0.91**  -1.03**  -1.66**  1.90**  0.03  0.09  065  0.38  0.06  -0.10
(11.52)  (18.71)  (0.31)  (0.24)  (0.76)  (0.76)  (5.66)  (63.01)  (1.22)  (0.30)  (0.39)  (16.61)
Unem  -0.15  -0.15  0.46  0.16**  0.73  0.82  -0.02  -0.04  -0.29*  -0.25**  -0.04  -0.11
(0.75)  (1.20)  (0.41)  (0.05)  (0.57)  (0.51)  (0.12)  (2.06)  (0.17)  (-0.07)  (0.09)  (1.05)
Nobs  42447  42447  42108  42108  41480  41480  5425  5425  6001  6001  5004  5004
Likelihood  -10999  -10999  -9841  -9841  -8262  -8270  -3210  -3213  -3868  -3869  -2556  -2628
chi squared  31.05**  29.53**  895.08**  529.39**  102.09**  85.52**  5.94  0.63  23.56*  21.35*  145.20**  2.28
Notes: Worker transitions among sectors across  five quarter period using overlapping panels from 1987-1993, Mexican  National Survey  of Unemployment.
Wa, Wi are forecasts of initial and alterate sector  wages in logs.  Wa-Wi constrains coefficients  equal and opposite.  Unem is average  unemployment rate across
period. Partially observed probit regressions  contain two constants,  one for inclination to move equation, and one for queuing equation.
Standard Errors in (), *= significant at 10%, ** at 5%.Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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